About
Résumé
SQL Portfolio
PhD Dissertation
Philosophy of Agency Portfolio
Machine Learning Portfolio (General)
Deep Reinforcement Learning Portfolio
AI Governance Portfolio
Personal website
About
Résumé
SQL Portfolio
PhD Dissertation
Philosophy of Agency Portfolio
Machine Learning Portfolio (General)
Deep Reinforcement Learning Portfolio
AI Governance Portfolio
About content coming soon.
SQL Portfolio content coming soon.
Project content loading…
Project content coming soon.
Portfolio content coming soon.
PhilosophyofDataScience.com
Website under development.
PhilosopherofAI.com
Website under development.
Portfolio content coming soon.
Portfolio content coming soon.
Portfolio content coming soon.
Botan Dolun
This dissertation investigates the nature of reason-possession, a topic that has received significant attention in recent philosophical literature. Existing discussions often center on a key puzzle: How can false beliefs appear to provide agents with reasons to act, making them rationally responsible for forming intentions based on these beliefs? This puzzle highlights a potential tension between the objective sense of reasons, understood as facts tied to the rational advisability of actions, and the subjective sense of reasons, grounded in an agent's rational criticizability. I offer a solution to this puzzle by introducing the Multifactorial Account (MA) of having normative practical reasons, developed through critiques of the extant Factoring Account and Two Relations Account. MA describes reason-possession as a state of mind where a person comes under a requirement of rationality—what I call the Practical Entailment Requirement (PER). Unlike the Instrumental Requirement, which has been traditionally invoked to explain normative conditions in instrumental reasoning, PER provides a comprehensive framework for understanding how attitudes generate rational options and determine the reasons agents have in practical reasoning. I argue that coming under an instance of PER explains why propositions— whether true or false—like <the glass is full of gin-and-tonic> or <I will drink gin-and-tonic>, can serve as an agent’s reasons when the agent is in a position to justifiably believe or intend to make them true. Ultimately, this dissertation aims to advance a deeper understanding of the relationship between practical reasoning and rational responsibility. Reason-possession, I contend, must be understood as integral to episodes of practical reasoning, shaped by a person’s attitudes and the normative demands of rationality.
botan.dolun@yahoo.com